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Abstract
Regulators should ensure the smooth functioning of the system and promote 
regional development. Making the health of financial institutions is therefore a pre-
requisite for a sustainable economic development. This paper contributes to the lit-
erature on the relationship between the financial stability and growth within the area 
of one country. This implies that institutional, legal, and cultural factors are more 
adequately controlled for and financial markets are more accurately bounded. Using 
a rich sample of Italian banks over the 2001–2012 period, this paper addresses 
whether different measures of financial distress affect economic development of 
labour market areas in Italy. Results show that the financial stability has a posi-
tive effect on local economic development, robust to alternative variables capturing 
financial vulnerability. The presence of spatial effects is tested showing that better 
financial conditions of the banking system in neighbouring areas have a detrimental 
effect on an area’s growth.
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1 Introduction
Financial stability represents a condition in which the financial system can with-
stand shocks without major disruption in financial intermediation and in the 
effective allocation of savings to productive investments (ECB 2012). In other 
words, the financial system is stable when it succeeds in transferring resources 
from savers to investors, in assimilating financial and real economic shocks, and 
in managing financial risks. Financial stability is a prerequisite for sustainable 
economic performances (see Dudley 2011). The recent financial crisis prompted 
policymakers and regulators to analyse whether the level of bank distress can 
influence economic development. Indeed, the core of the financial system—major 
banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, and financial market infrastructures—
should be made more resilient to adverse shocks and less susceptible to runs. This 
is true even though the openness of markets, the increased mobility of capitals, 
the growth of integration between countries, and the complexity of the financial 
instruments make the financial markets more vulnerable to several risks.
Among the main sources that make the financial system unstable, there is the 
risk-taking of banks. When financial institutions take more risks and allocate 
capital less efficiently, then the banking system is more vulnerable to economic 
shocks, producing negative effects for the economy as a whole. Other risks faced 
by the financial institutions, such as that of credit, may depend on the discre-
tion of managers who may take unnecessary risks in the interest of the bank. The 
existence of risky assets entails additional monitoring and screening costs that 
banks must sustain in order to quantify them. It follows that concentrated markets 
can count on higher capital, part of which is invested in monitoring and screening 
processes to reduce the share of risk-taking (Berger and DeYoung 1997). In the 
European context, regulators have tried to make banks more reliable (i.e. Basel II 
reform) to allow more lasting relationships for both firms and households. Indeed, 
financial stability induces a better and a smoother allocation of resources, mobi-
lizes savings, reduces risks, facilitates transactions, and ensures the emergence 
of innovative firms. In turn, economic performance can improve by converting 
the liquidity from deposits and savings to long-term investments. On the other 
hands, this mechanism might also create damage if deregulation and the presence 
of information asymmetries encourage banks to take more risks.
The main contribution of this paper is investigating both the direct and indi-
rect effects of bank soundness and financial stability on local economic develop-
ment. More specifically, the paper is closely related to the less-debated strand of 
the literature that considers the role of financial markets at the local level within 
countries (Usai and Vannini 2005; Valverde et al. 2007; Hasan et al. 2009; Deste-
fanis et al. 2014; Coccorese and Silipo 2015; Cavalcante 2018). It is very difficult 
to underline the role played by financial stability across countries with different 
backgrounds. We believe that investigating whether and how a high degree of 
bank soundness affects economic growth using data at the sub-national, rather 
than the national level, is particularly relevant. It is, instead, more appropriate to 
focus on local territories within a single country where history, institutions, and 
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legal framework are more homogenous. If the presence of a stable and efficient 
financial system can have a specific economic-stimulus impact, it is much more 
likely that this is more evident at the local level. In this framework, the money 
is tied to practical actions and interventions near where it is used for growth-
enhancing purposes, such that the interaction between financial intermediaries, 
households, and firms is more accurately defined and resources can be mobilized 
more efficiently. To capture this perspective, we rely upon highly territorially dis-
aggregated data such as Italian labour market areas (LMAs) corresponding to a 
deeper territorial disaggregation than NUTS 3-level subdivisions (see Sect.  2.2 
for details on LMAs). To capture the financial vulnerability of banks and to pre-
dict their distress, bank soundness is firstly calculated through the Z-score (the 
number of standard deviations by which returns would have to fall from the mean 
to wipe out all equity in the bank). We then make use of the accounting-based 
CAMELS variables (which stand for capital, asset quality, management, earnings, 
liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk). A two-step system GMM estimator with 
Windmeijer (2005)-corrected standard error in dynamic panel specification, over 
the period 2001–2012, is used to deal with the suspected endogeneity between 
the stability of the financial system and economic performance.
Results show that financial stability positively affects local economic devel-
opment (Destefanis et  al. 2014; Coccorese and Silipo 2015), and these results are 
robust to the use of more widely used indicators of financial stability, such as return 
on equity and return on assets, and to alternative variables capturing financial vul-
nerability (Chiaromonte et  al. 2015). Stable banks, located in the territories that 
grow more, act as a stimulus to reach higher levels of operations. The financial sta-
bility of banks still has a positive and significant effect on local economic develop-
ment, but lower in magnitude, in the years after a crisis. Finally, while the introduc-
tion of spatial effects does not modify the main conclusions, results also provide 
evidence that the presence of more efficient banking services in the geographic 
vicinity generates a pull effect due to the possibility that borrowers and investors 
may be attracted to these nearby services, take out credit, and consume in neigh-
bouring areas (Hasan et al. 2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the literature 
on the relationship between financial stability and economic development and the 
relative channels, highlighting the importance of a local perspective in the analysis. 
Section 3 describes the empirical approach, the measures of financial stability, and 
the data used in the analysis. Section  4 shows the main findings, underlining the 
accuracy of different sources of financial stability affecting economic development. 
Section 5 provides some robustness checks. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes.
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2  Financial stability and economic development: a regional 
perspective
2.1  Financial soundness–growth nexus: theoretical and empirical background
The literature highlights a positive relationship between financial development 
and economic growth (Bumann et al. 2013), drawing on cross-country (King and 
Levine 1993), time series (Arestis et al. 2001), and panel studies (Beck and Lev-
ine 2004). Due to a better allocation of resources, risks, and transactions, the sta-
bility of the financial sector can be an engine of growth. Several measures of 
financial development, defined as the policies, factors and institutions that lead 
to efficient intermediation and effective financial markets (WEF 2012), are used. 
The size of financial intermediaries is considered through the proportion of liq-
uid liabilities (King and Levine 1993; Huang 2005) and the ratio of bank deposit 
liabilities to gross domestic product (Demetriades and Hussein 1996). The impor-
tance of the banking sector is also taken into consideration by using the ratio 
of credit issued to the private sector to liquid liability (Saci and Holdied 2008). 
Proxies for banking sector development include bank deposits over gross domes-
tic product, banks’ overhead costs, banks’ concentration, and banks’ net interest 
margins (Antzoulatos and Thanopoulos 2008). The concept of liquidity prefer-
ence is also used to analyse the effect of money behaviour on the regional eco-
nomic performance of regions (Crocco et al. 2005).
Despite the above-mentioned measures of performance and activities of financial 
institutions, the importance of making the financial system stable has to be defined. 
How should changes in banking sector soundness affect economic development? 
The higher the financial stability of the system, the larger the level of capital held 
by the banks, and the greater their profitability. This ensures a substantial distribu-
tion of loans to households and firms. In turn, the higher the borrowing levels, the 
more sizable are the investment projects, with positive consequences on growth lev-
els. Therefore, one important channel is that of credit. Since Schumpeter, research 
and development activities, and likewise patents, are considered as new ideas and 
pieces of knowledge that may turn into innovation when commercially exploited 
(Schumpeter 1934, 1942). Entrepreneurs need credit to finance their innovations, 
and banks as well as financial markets could facilitate this mechanism. Bank-based 
systems (differently from marked-based systems) create more stable relationships 
and convince entrepreneurs to invest in innovation (Stiglitz 1985).
In this prospect, financial development refers to the increased functionality of 
local financial institutions in intermediating services related to investment and 
growth (Cavalcante 2018). More specifically, the relationship between finance and 
growth depends also on the firm’s reliance on external funds (Guiso et al. 2005; 
De Serres et al. 2006). Regional concentration and centralization of the banking 
system are relevant for firms’ investment choices (Cavalcante 2018). The ability 
of firms to better capture growth opportunities, thanks to the funding for invest-
ment, is relevant (Fisman and Love, 2004), as is firms’ probability of entry and 
survival in the market (Aghion et al. 2007; Beck et al. 2008). An improvement in 
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the borrowing conditions, due to more favourable credit standards, may help to 
produce a friendly environment for savers and investors. Consequently, resources 
are allocated more efficiently (Lown et al. 2000). A positive effect on economic 
development is expected in case financial institutions keep their minimum credit 
standards balanced, making it easier for borrowers to receive funding.
An additional channel through which financial stability can lead to increasing 
economic development is a decrease in cost for firms and households of financ-
ing spending. A more stable banking system may help to reduce interest rates on 
business and consumer debt, leading firms, and households to favour spending. In 
contrast, uncertainty due to financial instability of the banking system may make 
firms more careful about their investment and may prompt households to decrease 
their spending, since uncertainty affects the expected value of their future wealth, 
negatively affecting economic development (Hakkio and Keeton 2009; Bauducco 
et  al. 2011; Carlson et  al. 2011). Financial intermediaries can promote economic 
development also by monitoring the investment projects, as borrowers need to be 
scrutinized to prevent moral hazard ex-post. There is evidence that in more concen-
trated markets management efficiency generates a decrease in risk-taking behaviour 
with respect to partially competitive markets. This is consistent with the idea that 
banks with less local competition are able to increase their profits by indulging more 
freely in rent-seeking behaviour, minimizing their risk-taking. Therefore, the quality 
of their assets improves through additional screening processes (Barra et al. 2016a).
2.2  The relevance of an intra‑regional approach in financial market research: 
the case of Italy
It is specifically at the regional or even sub-regional level that factors related to the 
location of economic actors may affect the relationship between financial stability 
and economic development. Financial intermediaries strategically open branches at 
the local level to offer services where they could better serve households and small 
business (Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes 1997; Williams and Gardner 2003). Through 
this channel, they contribute more successfully to increase the social level of terri-
tories (Fuller and Jonas 2002). Borrowers might also prefer local solutions to build 
their borrowing relationship (Zazzaro 1997) as local banks are better informed on 
local economic conditions. Moreover, at the lower territorial level, monetary, legal, 
and cultural environments, where not observed, could more safely be assumed to 
be homogenous. Valverde and Fernandez (2004) analyse financial deepening and 
banks’ dependence, taking into account banks’ lending specialization. They strongly 
suggest that this relationship is likely to be more adequately evaluated at the regional 
level. Usai and Vannini (2005), within the context of Italy’s regional economic 
growth, show that the financial sector has a weak impact on growth, while, instead, 
cooperative banks and special credit institutions play an important role. Valverde 
et al. (2007) show that service-producing institutions that deliver innovations con-
tribute positively to regional gross domestic product. Hasan et al. (2009) show evi-
dence of banks’ abilities to provide financial services and products efficiently, from 
cost and profit perspectives, that positively affect regional growth. Coccorese and 
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Silipo (2015) find that finance is more relevant for growth in less developed areas 
of the country, even though the expansion of the financial sector has not helped 
to overcome the economic disparities between the two parts of Italy. The nexus 
between financial development and economic growth, relying upon territorially dis-
aggregated data, has also been underlined by Destefanis et al. (2014). They use both 
qualitative and quantitative proxies of financial development and find a positive and 
significant impact on gross domestic product per worker. This paper constitutes a 
natural key reference, as our study moves from it and uses both market-based and 
accounting-based measures of bank distress (higher or lower probability of insol-
vency risk) to explore their ability to predict local economic development.
To take into account the importance of measuring the financial stability–economic 
development relationship at the sub-national level, we rely on LMAs. They correspond 
to sub-regional geographical areas where the bulk of the labour force lives and works. 
It is also where establishments can find the largest amount of labour force necessary 
to occupy the offered jobs (see also Destefanis et al. 2014; Faggian et al. 2018). More 
specifically, LMAs stand for a group of municipalities—akin to the UK’s travel-to-
work-areas—adjacent to each other, geographically and statistically comparable, and 
characterized by common commuting flows of the working population. According to 
the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT), they represent the place where the individuals 
live and work and, above all, where their economic and social relationships take place 
and are defined on a functional basis, the key criterion being the proportion of com-
muters who cross the LMA boundary on their way to work. Nearly half of the LMAs 
in Italy (314, equal to 47.7% of the total) stand in the size class from 10 to 50 thousand 
inhabitants, whereas the highest-density population (3957.2 per square kilometre) lives 
in the LMAs of Naples. Rome is the biggest LMA in Italy. Sicilia is the region with 
Fig. 1  Territorial location of LMAs and regions in Italy— Year 2011. Notes: our elaboration
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the highest number of LMAs in Italy (77), followed by Lombardia (58) and Campania 
(54). In contrast, Molise and Valle d’Aosta, showing nine and three LMAs, respec-
tively, are those with the smallest number of areas. See Fig. 1 for a graphical represen-
tation of the LMAs’ and regions’ territorial location in Italy. Table 8 in the Appendix, 
instead, summarizes some LMAs’ characteristics by regions and territorial location. 
To be more precise, the dataset covers almost half of the LMAs of the country, as we 
concentrate the analysis only on those areas where at least one bank branch is present 
(see Sect. 3 for more details on the construction of the dataset). More specifically, we 
include 46% of the LMAs of the north-west area of the country. Around 63%, 47%, 
and 28% of the LMAs of the north-east, centre, and south of Italy, respectively, are 
taken into account (see Table 9 in the Appendix).
The Italian financial context fits perfectly with our research question, as impor-
tant differences regarding the competitiveness of the markets and the efficiency of 
the financial intermediaries are present among different geographical areas. Conse-
quently, the quality of the credit provided to firms and households may be consist-
ently different according to the area where banks are located (see Table 10 in the 
Appendix for some descriptive statistics on credit market structural indicators for 
Italy). Interestingly, when it comes to a market concentration index—higher in the 
South than in the North—the data show the presence of a tight oligopoly in the for-
mer area and of a loose oligopoly in the latter.
3  Empirical strategy and data
3.1  Investigating the stability–growth nexus: the advantage of a sub‑regional 
approach
To analyse the relationship between the stability of the financial system and local 
economic development, we specify the following dynamic panel model:
where ln is the natural logarithm, and GDPC is gross domestic product per capita 
(measured as the sum of the gross values added of all units divided by workers)1 
explained by GDPC
t−1 (its lagged value). FS is the financial stability indicator (see 
Sect. 3.2 for details on the variables used to proxy bank distress). LG is the labour 
growth defined as the number of employed individuals at time t minus the num-
ber of employed individuals at time t − 1 (see also Destefanis et al. 2014; Barra and 
Ruggiero 2020). TPC is the technology proxy controlling for the local state of the 
technology and industry structure, measured as the ratio between service workers 
and the sum of industry plus service workers, divided by the population in each area. 
(1)
lnGDPC
i,t = 1lnGDPCi,t−1 + 1lnFSi,t + 1LGi,t
+ 2lnTPCi,t + 3lnBCi,t + 4TIMEt + i + i,t
1 GDP per worker is constructed by updating the LMA value-added data from ISTAT with data from the 
Bureau van Dijk AIDA (AIDA is a database providing balance sheets and other information about Italian 
firms with a turnover of at least one million euro. See for further information: http:// aida. bvdep. com/).
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BC is the branch density, controlling for the distribution of banks in the territory and 
measured as the ratio between branches and the population in each area.2 TIME is 
time dummies, controlling for time-specific effects or unobservable shocks.  is the 
unobserved area-specific effect, and finally,  is the disturbance error. Subscripts i 
and t refer to the area of our analysis (LMA) and time periods (years), respectively. 
To take into account the characteristics of banks, the percentages of cooperative and 
commercial banks are included (popular banks as the benchmark group). Macro-
areas are also included to control for geographic effects, using dummy variables tak-
ing the value of 1 in case the bank is located in the north-west, north-east, centre, 
and southern3 areas of the country, respectively (southern region used as the bench-
mark group), and 0 otherwise. Finally, the structure of the market is also included, 
using dummy variables taking the value of 1 in case the LMA contains one bank 
(i.e. monopoly), two banks (i.e. duopoly), three banks (i.e. oligopoly), and more 
than three banks (i.e. perfect competition), respectively (LMAs with one bank used 
as the benchmark group) and 0 otherwise.
To eliminate the unobserved area-specific effect ( 
i
 ) in the dynamic panel specifi-
cation of the model (where the areas’ effects can change over time), we use the two-
step system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995; 
Blundell and Bond 1998) with corrected standard errors (Windmeijer 2005). To deal 
with suspected endogeneity between the stability of the financial system and eco-
nomic development (i.e. for instance changes in the economic conditions could lead 
to an increase in the demand or supply of loans), we instrument FS including lagged 
levels and differences. As usual, we check the correctness of the model through the 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions for validity of the instruments. The Arel-
lano-Bond test is used, instead, for testing the zero autocorrelation in the first-differ-
enced errors at order one—AR(1)—and autocorrelation between the errors’ terms 
over time—AR(2). See Table 1 for a description of the variables. In estimating the 
GMM model, we rely on STATA 13.
3.2  Measure of financial stability
A widely used indicator of bank soundness and financial instability is the Z-score 
(see among others Hesse and Cihak 2007; Laeven and Levine 2009; Unde and 
Heimeshoff 2009; Chiaramonte et al. 2015). More specifically, to proxy bank insol-
vency risk, we use two types of Z-score measures based on either the return on 
assets or the return on equity, represented as ZROA or ZROE , respectively. For each 






3 Southern area also includes the islands.
2 We have also used the branch density as the ratio between branches and square kilometre (as a measure 
of the accessibility to bank services across locations). Results, available on request, are similar.
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where ETA is the level of capitalization of the bank (i.e. equity to total assets). ROA 
denotes the ratio between profit and total assets (i.e. return on assets). ROE indicates 
the ratio between profit and total equity (i.e. return on equity). ROA and ROE 
are the standard deviations of the ROA and ROE , respectively, in the period ana-
lysed.4 Following Agoraki et  al. (2011) and Soedarmono et  al. (2013), ROA and 
ROE at time t are calculated on the basis of observations of ROA and ROE , respec-
tively, from time t to t − 2 (a three-period-based rolling window). They are consid-
ered as good proxies of a bank’s distance to the default (Rojas-Suarez 2002) and do 
not require strong assumptions about the distribution of the return on assets (Strobel 
2011). Both measures combine banks’ buffers (capital and profits) with the risks 
they face (measured by the standard deviation of returns). More specifically, they 
reflect the number of standard deviations by which returns would have to fall from 
the mean in order to wipe out equity. A higher value of Z-score implies a lower 
probability of insolvency risk (Unde and Heimeshoff 2009) and greater stability (i.e. 
inverse of the probability of defaults), providing a direct measure of the banking sys-
tem stability. The Z-score will then increase with the banks’ profitability and capital 
ratio and, instead, decrease with increases in the conditional volatility. Therefore, we 
expect a positive sign for the relationship between Z-scores (ZROA and ZROE) and 
economic development. ZROA and ZROE are measured at the bank level and then 
averaged out at the LMA level.
As an alternative to the Z-score, to capture the financial vulnerability of banks 
and to predict their distress, we use CAMELS variables (see for instance Poghosyan 
and Čihák 2011; Chiaramonte et al. 2015). As denoted by the acronym, CAMELS 
variables measure specific bank characteristics (capital, asset quality, management, 
earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk) and indicate the bank’s sound-
ness dependent of financial accounting values, assuming that accounting data are 
a good proxy of bank quality as well as of a bank’s financial vulnerability. The first 
component of the CAMELS variables is a proxy of a bank’s capital measured by the 
ratio of total equity to total assets (ETA). Higher values of ETA mean that banks are 
more resilient to shocks (i.e. low leverage). We expect a positive sign for the relation 
between ETA and economic development. A proxy of asset quality is the second 
covariate inside the CAMELS variables, being the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans (NPLL). The higher the ratio, the lower the quality of the bank’s loan 
portfolio and the higher the probability of bank distress. We expect a negative sign 
between NPLL and economic development. Managerial quality (third component) is 
proxied by the ratio of cost to total assets (CTA). Higher values of this ratio indicate 
low managerial quality and a higher probability of distress. We expect a negative 
sign between CTA and economic development. As for earnings, the fourth compo-






4 Due to its skewness, we use a log transformation of the Z-score.
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the likelihood of a distress event. We expect a positive sign between both ROA and 
ROE and economic development. Liquidity, the fifth component, is measured by 
the net (customer) loans to deposit ratio (LD). Higher liquidity may better satisfy 
firms’ and households’ demand for financial services. However, higher liquidity may 
also lead to a higher probability of distress. Indeed, banks that finance large portions 
of their loan portfolios with short-term liabilities are more exposed to refinancing 
problems in adverse scenarios. We expect a positive sign between LD and economic 
development in the former case and a negative sign in the latter. Finally, the sixth 
component of the CAMELS variables corresponds to the sensitivity to market risk, 
proxied by the services to revenue ratio (SR). Diversification could lead to a reduc-
tion of risks and therefore to a lower probability of insolvency and to greater bank 
stability. It is also true that a higher dependence on market-related income, instead, 
might decrease a bank’s stability, especially in times of financial market crises. We 
expect a positive sign between SR and economic development in the former case 
and, instead, a negative sign in the latter case. Again, CAMELS variables are meas-
ured at the bank level and then averaged out at the LMA level.
3.3  Data
Data on financial intermediaries are collected from BilBank 2000, distributed by 
ABI (Associazione Bancaria Italiana). They provide a large time extension and are 
rich in information on bank balance sheets over the 2001–2012 period (see Table 1 
for details on the definition of the variables).5
The sample of banks consists of cooperative, commercial and popular banks, 
excluding branches of banks headquartered abroad. In particular, we use a sample 
of Italian banks classified by the Bank of Italy as: major (average funds interme-
diated more than 65 billion euros), large (average funds intermediated between 27 
and 65 billion euros), medium (average funds intermediated between 9 and 27 bil-
lion euros), small (average funds intermediated between 1.3 and 9 billion euros) and 
minor (average funds intermediated less than 1.3 billion euros). All monetary aggre-
gates are in thousands of deflated 2005 euros.
Employment is from the ISTAT LMA data set. In addition, the technology proxy 
(the ratio between service workers and the sum of industry plus service workers) 
comes from the same source. GDP per worker is constructed by updating the LMA 
value-added data from ISTAT with data from the Bureau van Dijk AIDA6 (see also 
Destefanis et al. 2014; Barra et al. 2016a, b; Barra and Zotti, 2019). LMA-level data 
for branches, (non-financial institutions) deposits and loans are from the Bank of 
Italy (Bollettino Statistico). Table  2 describes the sample used in the analysis by 
year and geographical location, taking the average of variables for LMA level.
5 We do not have information on some of the variables used in the analysis at LMA level for years before 
2001 and after 2012.
6 See footnote 1.
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Table 3  Effect of financial stability on local economic development—using Z-score, its components, and 
CAMELS variables
Bold values refer to the coefficients which are statistically significant
Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC)





ln(GDPC)t−1 0.844*** 0.836*** 0.781*** 0.766*** 0.806*** 0.808***























LG −0.0547 −0.0597* −0.0794** −0.0804** −0.0554 −0.0555
(0.0337) (0.0344) (0.0367) (0.0350) (0.0388) (0.0388)
ln(TPC) 0.0206*** 0.0234*** 0.0264*** 0.0283*** 0.0191*** 0.0185***
(0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0060) (0.0059)
ln(BC) 0.0033 0.0024 −0.0021 0.0045 −0.0081 −0.0068
(0.0151) (0.0159) (0.0143) (0.0170) (0.0153) (0.0150)
AB(1) −6.45*** −6.46*** −6.52*** −6.52*** −6.62*** −6.52***
AB(2) −0.57 −0.22 −0.14 0.06 −0.05 0.01
Sargan 295.36 296.68 294.04 296.68 294.57 294.32
Type of banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012
Obs 2985 2985 2956 2956 2948 2948
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4  Empirical evidence
4.1  Financial stability–economic development nexus at the LMA level
The GMM estimates of the local economic growth model are presented in Table 3. 
All estimates are carried out on the full sample period (2001–2012). As expected 
due to the lagged dependent term, the Arellano–Bond AR(1) test presents evidence 
against the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors at 
order one. Moreover, both the Sargan and the Arellano–Bond AR(2) tests do not 
reject H0, suggesting validity for the over-identifying restrictions and the absence of 
second-order serial correlation.
The lagged value of GDP per capita (GDPC) has a significant coefficient with pos-
itive sign in all models. The log of the Z-score is positive and statistically significant, 
as predicted, both when the ZROA (Table 3, Column 1) and when the ZROE are used 
(Table 3, Column 2). The positive relationship between the Z-score and local eco-
nomic development suggests that greater bank stability (lower probability of insol-
vency risk as proxied by higher values of Z-scores) fosters economic development 
of LMAs, through a direct channel of influence. The higher the stability of the sys-
tem in terms of risk and the ability to allocate resources into good investments, the 
higher the rate of economic performance of the LMA. To take into account whether 
the socio-economic environment plays a role in shaping the relationship between 
bank stability and economic development, we control for a measure of the job market 
(LG), the local state of technological and industry structure (TPC), and a measure of 
the bank presence in the territory (BDC). Estimates, for all models, show a positive 
and significant relationship between technology and local economic development. A 
high level of technology in the industry sector brings up local economic development.
To explore which source of financial stability contributes the most to economic 
development, we decompose the financial stability indicator. More specifically, we 
firstly regress the variable for economic development on the three components of 
the ZROA: capitalization (equity of total assets), profitability (return on assets), and 
volatility of profitability (standard deviation of return on assets). Secondly, we use 
the two components of the ZROE: the ratio between profit and total equity (return 
on equity) and volatility of profitability (standard deviation of return on equity). 
When using the components of ZROA (Table 3, Column 3), the positive relationship 
between bank stability and economic development of LMAs is largely explained 
by the bank’s ROA. The empirical evidence shows the same pattern also when we 
decompose the ZROE. Indeed, ROE seems to be the main variable explaining the 
relationship between stability and GDP per capita (Table 3, Column 4).7
7 Results are also confirmed when the components of both ZROA and ZROE are individually used. 
Results are available on request.
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4.2  Do CAMELS‑related covariates influence economic development of LMAs?
Although the Z-score is a recognized measure of bank stability in the literature (see 
among others Houston et al. 2010; Beck et al. 2012; Fiordelisi and Mare 2014; Chi-
aromonte et al. 2015), it has also been criticized due to its high dependence on the 
quality of the accounting framework. Indeed, as banks may smooth the accounting 
data, the Z-score may turn out to be a too-positive reflection of bank financial stabil-
ity (Laeven and Majnoni 2003) and a poor measure of bank distress (Poghsoy and 
Cihak 2011). Therefore, we also present the results by using CAMELS variables as 
a measure of bank financial stability.
Columns 5 and 6 in Table  3 show that the asset quality measure (NPLL), the 
proxy for managerial quality (CTA), and the earnings variables (ROA and ROE) are 
statistically significant with the expected sign. More specifically, the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (NPLL) is negative. The higher the ratio, the lower 
the quality of the bank’s portfolio and the higher the probability of bank distress, 
having negative effects on local economic development. The cost to total assets 
ratio (CTA) is also negative, confirming that part of the financial stability–economic 
development nexus goes through the managerial quality of the banks. Indeed, finan-
cial institutions with a higher value of cost to total asset ratio have a low manage-
rial quality and a higher probability of distress, having a negative effect on local 
economic development. The ROA is positive. As expected, the relationship between 
financial stability and economic development seems to be related to the level of 
bank profitability. An increase in profitability reduces the likelihood of distress hav-
ing a positive effect on local economic development. The same positive relationship 
holds when ROE is used. Finally, the proxy for the sensitivity to market ratio (SR) 
is positive and statistically significant. Bank diversification of risk could lead to a 
lower probability of insolvency and to greater bank stability, having positive effects 
on local economic development. The proxies for liquidity (LD) and for the bank’s 
capital (ETA) are not statistically significant.8 Finally, as for the socio-economic 
environmental characteristics, results confirm a positive and significant relationship 
between technology (TPC) and local economic development.
4.3  A further exploration of the results: the role of spillover effects
We extend the analysis to address potential geographical spillovers. To explore whether 
geographical space has an impact on the relationship between financial stability and 
local economic development, we specify a spatial-lag model such that the financial sta-
bility of banks can spill over to the area i . In other words, we take into account that the 
development of area i depends systematically on the financial stability development in 
neighbouring areas k ∈ I , where I is the set of all the areas (Anselin 1988). Geographi-
cal data on latitude and longitude of LMAs are used to construct a binary type of spatial 
weight matrix to weight the financial stability and economic development indicators of 
8 Results are also confirmed when the CAMELS variables are individually used. Results are available on 
request.
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all neighbouring areas. The unit of distance is kilometres (see Kondo 2017). More spe-
cifically, we firstly add to Eq. (1) the term ( lnFS
i,t∗W ), which is the weighted average 
of bank financial stability across I
i
 areas’ neighbouring area i . Its coefficient measures 
whether economic development at the LMA level indirectly benefits, suffers, or is inde-
pendent from the bank financial stability (due to the presence of banks with a high level 
of financial stability) of neighbours. Secondly, we add to Eq. (1) the term lnGDPC
i,t∗W , 
which is the weighted average GDPC across I
i
 areas’ neighbouring area i . It is included 
to control for spillovers due to the economic development of neighbouring areas.
Table 4  Effect of financial stability on local economic development – The effects of spatial spillovers
Bold values refer to the coefficients which are statistically significant
Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC)




ln(GDPC)t−−1 0.842*** 0.838*** 0.666*** 0.576*** 0.838*** 0.836***
(0.0391) (0.030) (0.0293) (0.0394) (0.266) (0.0312)
ln(GDPC)t-1*W 0.469*** 0.528*** −0.0013 −0.0012
(0.0617) (0.0515) (0.0077) (0.0009)








LG −0.0546 −0.0646* −0.0585 −0.0633*
(0.0546) (0.0345) (0.589) (0.0360)
ln(TPC) 0.0196** 0.0230*** 0.0212 0.0230***
(0.0090) (0.0052) (0.103) (0.0055)
ln(BC) 0.0071 0.0083 0.0018 0.0001
(0.0444) (0.0160) (0.580) (0.016)
AB(1) −6.45*** −6.47*** −6.43*** −6.46*** −2.16** −6.47***
AB(2) −0.53 −0.21 −0.53 −0.22 −0.12 −0.20
Sargan 297.95 296.28 313.29 296.67 270.38 284.54
Type of banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012
Obs 2985 2985 2985 2985 2985 2985
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Table 4 summarizes the results. We first use the weighted average of bank financial 
stability across areas’ neighbouring area i (Table 4, Columns 1 and 2). Table 4, Column 
1, shows that financial stability promotes economic performance. However, economic 
development at the LMA level does not depend on the bank financial stability of neigh-
bours as proxied by bank ROA. When we measure, instead, bank financial stability with 
ROE, we still find that a higher degree of stability in the banking system is associated 
with an increase in economic development. However, we also find a negative and sta-
tistically significant coefficient on the spatial weighted variable, meaning that economic 
development at the LMA level suffers from the bank financial stability of neighbours 
(Table 4, Column 2). There is not a straightforward theoretical prediction of the spatial 
effects. Indeed, a positive coefficient could be expected in the case that better condi-
tions of the banking system in neighbouring areas might also contribute to increase an 
area’s growth by incentivizing real economic interaction. A negative coefficient could 
be, instead, expected if better financial conditions of the banking system in neighbour-
ing areas may attract investments over the border and therefore have a detrimental effect 
on an area’s growth. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the spatial 
weighted bank financial stability suggests that having more efficient banking services in 
the geographic vicinity generates a pull effect due to the possibility that borrowers and 
investors may be attracted to such nearby banking services, take out credit, and con-
sume in neighbouring areas (see also Hasan et al. 2009 for a similar result). Columns 
3 and 4 in Table 4 summarize the results for the weighted average GDPC across areas’ 
neighbouring area i , showing that an area benefits, in terms of economic development, 
from being close to a prosperous area. Finally, we add all factors together. Results, sum-
marized in Table 4, Columns 5 and 6, do not show evidence that geographical space has 
an impact on the relationship between financial stability and economic development. 
However, the empirical evidence also indicates that the spatial effects do not modify the 
main conclusions—that financial stability fosters economic performance of LMAs (at 
least when ZROE is used to proxy bank soundness).
5  Sensitivity test and robustness of empirical results
We performed a number of tests to further explore the results.
Firstly, we examine whether the results depend on the distribution of the finan-
cial stability by focussing on the banks at different tertiles of the bank financial dis-
tress proxies. Table 5 summarizes the results for ZROA (Columns 1–3, at 1st, 2nd, 
and 3rd tertile of ZROA) and ZROE (Columns 4–6, at 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tertile of 
ZROE), showing that both proxies of banks’ financial stability have a direct positive 
and significant effect on local economic development when banks with a value of 
stability in the 1st and 2nd tertiles are considered. The result may be explained by 
the intuition of an “optimal” financial stability level; the effect of financial stability 
seems to be not relevant for growth if the level of stability is higher than this level 
(assuming that this level is around the 2nd tertile observed in the sample).
Secondly, we examine whether the results depend on the distribution of the measure 
of the economic development. To explore this issue, we use a two-step with fixed effects 
quantile regression (Canay 2011) and estimate the effects of financial stability of banks 
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on local economic development at different percentiles of GDP. Table 6 summarized the 
results when ZROA (Columns 1–5, at the 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th percentile of 
GDP) and ZROE (Columns 6–10, at the 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, and 95th percentile of 
GDP) are used as proxies of financial distress. The empirical evidence shows that banks’ 
financial stability has a direct positive and significant effect on local economic develop-
ment, especially at the highest quantiles of the economic development distribution. This 
reveals the presence of virtuous circles characterized by stable banks, located in the terri-
tories that grow more, which in turn act as a stimulus to reach higher levels of operations.
Thirdly, we also explore the potential role of the latest financial crisis that could 
affect the second part of the period under scrutiny. We estimate again the main 
model and add a dummy variable (CRISIS), taking the value of 1 in years after 
2007, and 0 otherwise. The results, summarized in Table 7, Columns 1 and 2, are 
similar and suggest that greater uncertainty due to the financial crisis lowers eco-
nomic development of LMAs (negative and statistical coefficient of the dummy 
Table 5  Effect of financial stability (1st, 2nd, and 3rd tertile) on local economic development
Bold values refer to the coefficients which are statistically significant
Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC)
ZROA ZROE
1st tertile 2nd tertile 3rd tertile 1st tertile 2nd tertile 3rd tertile
ln(GDPC)t−1 0.862*** 0.932*** 0.713*** 0.701*** 0.934*** 0.724***
(0.0426) (0.0216) (0.0562) (0.0526) (0.0267) (0.0599)
ln(ZROA) 0.0230*** 0.0157** −0.00732
(0.00448) (0.00672) (0.00717)
ln(ZROE) 0.0565*** 0.0355*** −0.0267
(0.00565) (0.0121) (0.0208)
LG −0.136* −0.0470 −0.0206 −0.0111 −0.201*** −0.0772
(0.0725) (0.0551) (0.0560) (0.0581) (0.0486) (0.0639)
ln(TPC) 0.0174** 0.0288*** 0.0367*** 0.0104 0.0268*** −0.0130
(0.00834) (0.00866) (0.0127) (0.0105) (0.00637) (0.0549)
ln(BC) 0.00726 0.000695 −0.0226 0.0208 −0.000277 0.00422
(0.0209) (0.0165) (0.0247) (0.0295) (0.0195) (0.0324)
AB(1) −5.65*** −5.91*** −2.79*** −6.34*** −4.83*** −4.58***
AB(2) −1.13 1.27 −0.17 0.56 −0.03 −1.37
Sargan 170.25 217.19 211.60 125.97 203.6 199.69
Type of banks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012
Obs 908 1003 1074 975 940 1070
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CRISIS in all models). To further explore the role of the crisis, we also interact the 
CRISIS variable with the stability measures. Both when ZROA and ZROE are used 
as proxies of bank soundness (Table 7, Columns 3 and 4), the empirical evidence 
suggests that the financial stability of banks has an additional positive and signifi-
cant effect on local economic development in the years after the crisis. This result 
could be consistent with the idea that financial stability is important for promoting 
economic performance even more in the years following the latest financial crisis.
Table 7  Effect of financial stability on local economic development – The effect of the crisis
Bold values refer to the coefficients which are statistically significant
Standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Interaction test for the null hypothesis that  H0 = ZROA/ZROE*CRISIS = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC) ln(GDPC)
ZROA ZROE ZROA ZROE
ln(GDPC)t−1 0.804*** 0.820*** 0.808*** 0.819***









LG −0.0682** −0.0840** −0.0667** −0.0776**
(0.0321) (0.0332) (0.0330) (0.0333)
ln(TPC) 0.0283*** 0.0333*** 0.0263*** 0.0284***
(0.0059) (0.0056) (0.00620) (0.00727)
ln(BC) 0.0243* 0.0284* 0.0322** 0.0338**
(0.0141) (0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0155)
CRISIS −0.0407*** −0.0381*** −0.0669*** −0.0878***
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.00849) (0.0109)
Interaction test 10.14*** 22.10***
AB(1) −6.64*** −6.70*** −6.64*** −6.70***
AB(2) 1.69 1.38 1.78 1.28
Sargan 294.04 293.25 287.26 294.50
Type of banks Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro-area Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Structure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012 2001–2012
Obs 2985 2985 2985 2985
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6  Summary and concluding remarks
Financial markets are properly defined at the local level, where legal and institu-
tional characteristics are more homogenous. This study empirically addresses the 
relationship between financial stability of the banking system and economic devel-
opment of LMAs in Italy. The idea that the financial system may contribute to the 
social economic and cultural development of the area in which banks are located has 
been discussed in the literature. However, only a few quantitative estimates regard-
ing the impact of the banking system’s level of distress on the community are pre-
sent. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to explore the finance sta-
bility–growth nexus using banks operating over a geographically restricted area such 
as LMAs, where the bulk of the labour force lives and works. More stable banks can 
exert a positive role over the territory in several ways. They improve the efficiency 
in the allocation of savings across investment loans. They produce better informa-
tion through long and strong lending relationships. Financing entrepreneurs engaged 
in research and development activities and decreasing the costs of financing spend-
ing for firms and households are important channels. To shed more light on this rel-
evant topic, we have focused on the Italian experience, using a rich sample of banks 
over the 2001–2012 period and employing a two-step system GMM estimator.
The empirical results highlight that a higher degree of stability in the banking system is 
associated with an increase in the economic development of LMAs. Therefore, financial 
stability promotes and positively predicts a high level of economic performance. Results 
are stable to different indicators of bank soundness and financial instability. The positive 
relationship between bank stability and local economic development is explained, mainly, 
by the bank’s return on average assets and equity. A higher ratio between profit and total 
assets/total equity is related to a higher level of capitalization and, therefore, to greater 
economic development. Moreover, a higher level of a bank’s return on average assets 
and equity increases the ability to allocate resources into good investments or projects 
(i.e. helping firms and households in financing spending), positively affecting the rate of 
economic development of a certain area. Several components capturing banks’ financial 
stability, such as asset quality (non-performing loans to total loans ratio), managerial qual-
ity (cost to total assets), a measure of earnings (return on average assets or equity), and 
sensitivity to market risk (services to revenue ratio), have important effects on local eco-
nomic development. The presence of spatial effects is tested. Our findings reveal that bet-
ter financial conditions of the banking system in neighbouring areas have a detrimental 
effect on an area’s growth, possibly attracting investments over the border.
Our analysis could suffer from some limitations and some potential concerns.
First, the use of such a fine territorial stratification (LMAs) minimizes the dif-
ferences in legal and regulatory exogenous factors affecting financial development. 
LMAs are somehow representative of the local labour market. It is also true, how-
ever, that this study indirectly assumes that local financial markets coincide with 
local labour markets. This is a strong assumption, as, for instance, an important pro-
cess for a firm such as that of borrowing could be satisfied by exploring the finan-
cial market nearby its local LMAs. A second possible concern regards the Arel-
lano–Bond system GMM model and the influence that spatial dependence might 
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have on the covariance estimators. Indeed, in the case of spatial dependence, the 
GMM model may not produce a consistent estimation of the standard errors of the 
coefficients. In particular, when a spatial lag of the dependent variable is included 
in the model, a consistent estimation is based on the maximization of a compressed 
likelihood, and the Windmeijer correction might not be enough to solve the prob-
lem. An alternative strategy would be relying on a fixed effects panel model with 
spatially dependent variables (i.e. Millo and Piras 2012), which is able to treat the 
special dependence appropriately. However, in this way, we would not be able to 
take into account the more than suspected endogeneity problem between financial 
stability and economic growth (see also Hasan et  al. 2009, who applied the same 
procedure in the financial environment). Finally, a further limitation is that we rely 
only on LMAs where at least one bank branch is present. This means that all the 
local systems without banks are excluded from the analysis, leading to a more dis-
continuous sample. Indeed, it could be argued that we are not considering firms 
operating in the systems without bank borrowing. In other words, the presence of at 
least one branch of a bank could be endogenous. To solve this issue, a larger territo-
rial aggregation could be used which would cover all the country’s regions. How-
ever, LMAs have long been recognized as relevant for assessing the effectiveness of 
local policy decisions and are, in our opinion, a useful and harmonized geographical 
disaggregation to impart an intra-regional approach to financial market research.
Keeping these concerns in mind, this article contributes to the limited existing 
research, shedding further light on the effects that the financial stability of banks 
might have on raising the ratio of local income per capita, and also including the spa-
tial structure in the analysis. Financial stability, occurring when the banking system 
works in terms of health and governance, may ensure social welfare and may pro-
mote regional and sub-regional development. When the financial system is healthy 
and stable, financial intermediaries can grant loans to households and businesses 
more easily in order to increase investments in the area. Consequently, an increase 
in the volume of goods and services is generated, in turn improving economic devel-
opment. Indeed, financial stability may be considered as a public good, having a 
negative effect on social welfare and economic growth when risks are not regularly 
checked. This means that the provision of financial stability cannot be ensured only 
by private decisions and requires regulation and supervision of a common agency to 
be delivered. In other words, it will not be provided if left solely to the market and 
policy makers as well as regulators need to ensure the smooth functioning of the 
banking system in order to promote local economic development. An important step 
towards the regulation of financial institutions is necessary, to monitor systematic 
risks and to make the stability of the banking system an important prerequisite for 
sustainable economic growth. Ensuring the health of the financial system is a public 
policy to avoid situations where instability generates negative externalities.
Appendix
See Tables 8, 9 and 10.
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Table 8  LMAs characteristics by regions and territorial location
Our elaboration
Regions (NUTS 2 
level)






and working in 
LMAs
Piemonte 37 1204 4,223,735 1,462,895 1,448,909
Valle d’Aosta 3 78 123,803 44,553 44,906
Lombardia 58 1531 9,003,080 3,284,776 3,298,014
Trentino-Alto 
Adige
33 341 946,446 334,425 334,678
Veneto 34 581 4,502,412 1,613,435 1,609,156
Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia
11 217 1,196,720 411,966 412,921
Liguria 16 237 1,558,790 462,621 465,877
Emilia-Romagna 41 356 4,025,358 1,472,306 1,476,901
Toscana 53 290 3,512,420 1,174,511 1,172,133
Umbria 17 90 823,603 261,501 256,947
Marche 33 248 1,467,679 492,586 492,622
Lazio 25 381 5,115,887 1,547,496 1,554,765
Abruzzo 19 302 1,255,603 359,708 359,601
Molise 9 138 324,175 83,176 83,709
Campania 54 548 5,693,038 1,143,501 1,138,064
Puglia 44 254 4,016,240 896,000 890,954
Basilicata 19 128 588,476 142,598 148,761
Calabria 58 410 2,017,408 409,916 408,888
Sicilia 77 390 4,968,991 1,014,431 1,014,588
Sardegna 45 377 1,631,880 410,411 410,418
North-West 114 3050 1.49e + 07 5,254,845 5,257,706
North-East 119 1495 1.07e + 07 3,832,132 3,833,656
Centre 128 1009 1.09e + 07 3,476,094 3,476,467
South 203 1780 1.39e + 07 3,034,899 3,029,977
Island 122 767 6,600,871 1,424,842 1,425,006
Italy 686 8101 5.70e + 07 1.70e + 07 1.70e + 07
Table 9  Number of LMAs in the sample and in Italy by territorial location
Our elaboration
Macro-areas of the 
country
LMAs covered in our 
sample 2001–2012






North-West 626 114 1368 45.76
North-East 898 119 1428 62.88
Centre 726 128 1536 47.26
South 1111 325 3900 28.49
Italy 3361 686 8232 41.93
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